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DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/17
TAGS: [PARM](#) [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#)
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 9, 2010

REF: 10 CD GENEVA 31 (SFO-GVA-VIII-017)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-030.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: February 9, 2010

Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:50 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) At the Telemetry Working Group meeting co-chaired by Mr. Siemon and General Poznikhir, the Russian side provided responses to the U.S. questions on the Russian proposal dated February 2 (Reftel). The Russian side expressed the view that the Telemetry Working Group was the appropriate forum to discuss the Tauscher-Ryabkov telemetry questions. During the session, the Russian side asked some questions of its own. They defended their position that Parties be allowed to suspend telemetry exchange, explaining there would be no treaty impact because telemetry was not needed for treaty verification. The U.S side pushed back saying that it was a mistake to think of the telemetry provision as

unimportant and stating clearly that the United States would never accept a treaty provision that allowed one Party to unilaterally walk away from an obligation. The Russian side again pushed the issue of missile defense and its relationship with telemetry. They stated the only reason that the United States wanted telemetry from self-contained dispensing mechanisms was to support missile defense development. Both sides agreed that the U.S. side would deliver a proposal before scheduling the next meeting. End summary.

¶4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Questions One, Two and Three: Who Gets to Choose Data?; Questions Four and Five: Why No Post-Boost Data?; Questions Six and Seven: Dealing with Equipment and Recording; Question Eight: Understanding When Encryption Would be Used; Questions Nine and Ten: Clarifying "Processing and "Impeding;" Questions Eleven, Twelve and Thirteen: Questions About Interpretive Data Lead to a Russian Challenge on Telemetry Exchange Suspension; and U.S. Proposal Format

QUESTIONS ONE, TWO AND THREE: WHO GETS TO CHOOSE DATA?

¶5. (S) Poznikhir thanked Siemon for providing written questions on the Russian proposal of February 2. He indicated the Russian side

had time to study the questions and was prepared to provide responses during the meeting. Poznikhir said that he would also ask a few questions of his own during the meeting.

Begin text of U.S. questions on Russian proposal:

U.S. Questions on Russian Proposal of February 2, 2010

The following questions are keyed to specific paragraphs in the paper "Basic approaches of the Russian side to the exchange of telemetric information":

Paragraph 2

¶1. Is there a role for the receiving Party in determining which launches will qualify for exchange of telemetric data?

¶2. Would telemetry for prototype missiles be exchanged, and under what process?

¶3. What would prevent a Party from selecting five launches in such a way as to minimize the useful information in the exchange?

Paragraph 3

¶4. Since this data was included in the START telemetric data

exchanges, why would an exchange of telemetric data for the SCDM or post boost vehicle be excluded in this treaty?

Paragraph 4

¶5. Would reentry vehicle telemetry be excluded from the exchange?

Paragraph 5

¶6. Would it be sufficient to provide information for purchase of commercially-available equipment after carrying out the initial demonstration of recording media and playback equipment?

¶7. If a party continues to use the same type of recording media and playback equipment used during START, would that equipment have to be demonstrated and new equipment provided? Is there any new equipment or techniques to be demonstrated for START Follow-On?

Paragraph 6

¶8. Would the telemetric information that is encrypted be provided in an encrypted form with the keys necessary to decrypt it, or would the information be decrypted prior to recording it for release to the other Party?

¶9. What does the term "processing" mean? Is that term the same as "playing back"?

¶10. What is meant by "shall not impede"?

Paragraph 7

¶11. Will the specifications to define telemetric data timing and structure be provided along with the staging and separation information included on the recording media?

¶12. If so, is the intent to provide interpretive data to determine timing and structure, but not the specific information for conversion of the data into physical values of parameters?

¶13. How does the "shall not impede" concept work in practice in exchanging interpretive data. Why would the exchange of interpretive data be limited?

Paragraph 8

¶14. Would data denial techniques be used on launches where telemetric information is exchanged?

End text.

¶6. (S) Poznikhir noted the telemetry questions Under Secretary of

State for Arms Control and International Security Tauscher provided Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov. Moscow had provided him a copy of the questions and he believed it was more appropriate for the questions to be discussed in the Telemetry Working Group rather than at the political level. Siemon indicated that Ambassador Antonov had raised the questions with Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller; however, she had not seen the questions prior to Antonov providing her a copy in Russian. Both Gottemoeller and Siemon had noted that the senior U.S. leadership tracked START Follow-on (SFO) issues and would continue to ask questions when they wanted to clarify or understand specific aspects of the emerging Russian position on issues of concern such as telemetry. Poznikhir suggested he present the Russian responses to the U.S.-provided questions.

¶7. (S) Paragraph 2. Question 1. Is there a role for the receiving Party in determining which launches will qualify for exchange of telemetric data?

¶8. (S) In response to question 1, Poznikhir stated on many previous occasions the Russian side had indicated the Party which conducted the launch had the exclusive right to determine on which launches telemetric data would be exchanged. As the Russian side had stated in December in Geneva, during the Moscow meetings, and in the Russian proposals on the Basic Approaches to the Exchange of Telemetric Information, dated February 2, (Reftel), the receiving Party would not participate in the selection of telemetric data exchanged; this was a fundamental position of the Russian side. The Russian side saw no place for telemetry in the SFO treaty and simply the act of exchanging data was a compromise by the Russian side to move toward the U.S. position.

¶9. (S) Siemon stated that he wanted to understand how the sides would make the process of exchange work; would the sides discuss the details of the exchange when the sides met during the 65-day period at the beginning of each calendar year? Poznikhir noted that only the agreed number of launches conducted during the previous year on which telemetric data would be exchanged would be discussed during the 65-day period. The aggregate number was the only item to be decided. He reiterated that a list of launches planned for the upcoming year would not be exchanged. Poznikhir remarked that additional details of the process could be addressed when the sides discussed the Annex to the Protocol.

¶10. (S) Paragraph 2. Question 2. Would telemetry for prototype missiles be exchanged, and under what process?

¶11. (S) In response to question 2, Poznikhir remarked that the answer fell in line with the answer to question one; the conducting Party had the exclusive right to determine on which launches telemetric data would be exchanged. If the conducting Party decided to provide telemetric data from a prototype launch, then it was a windfall for the receiving Party. However, since neither side had a prototype, he did not see this happening.

¶12. (S) Paragraph 2. Question 3. What would prevent a Party from selecting five launches in such a way as to minimize the useful information in the exchange?

¶13. (S) In response to question 3, Poznikhir asked what did the U.S. side mean by "useful information," that is, useful for what? Siemon responded that the reason the U.S. side wanted the exchange of telemetry was for transparency, to permit each side to have an idea of the process the other side used to develop and deploy new ICBMs and SLBMs. The purpose of the exchange was not for verification. The original U.S. proposal provided for the unencrypted exchange of telemetric information and provided for a number of exemptions to be exercised by the Party conducting the launch. These exemptions allowed a Party the flexibility to protect information it believed sensitive and determine what information it would release. The concept of the exchange of unencrypted telemetric data and a limited number of exemptions provided a balance in the process for the conducting and receiving Parties. When one side exclusively controlled the exchange process, the balance was in question. Siemon indicated that the first three questions were asked to determine whether the receiving side had any influence on the choice of launches on which telemetry would be exchanged. He now understood the Russian position that exclusive control of the selection process was retained by the testing Party.

¶14. (S) Poznikhir noted that the sides had discussed the idea of parity during the previous meeting and stated that it was difficult to have parity when one side continued developing its missile defense system against the other. The Russian side was not placing missile defense systems near U.S. borders. Poznikhir indicated he had discussed the effect missile defense had on force structure with Missile Defense Agency Director, Lt General O'Reilly during his visit to Moscow when O'Reilly conducted a presentation on missile defense near Russian boundaries. He asked O'Reilly whether he would have concerns if Russia placed missile defense interceptors near U.S. borders to which O'Reilly responded in the affirmative. Poznikhir could not understand how an exchange of telemetry as a transparency measure would help parity in a positive manner. Transparency only appeared to permit one side to use the information provided to build its missile defense capabilities. Since Russia was not building a missile defense system, transparency provided an advantage to the United States.

¶15. (S) Poznikhir stated that the exchange of telemetry from the self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM) would have the same net result. There was no treaty verification need for this data and the United States would use this information to enhance its missile defense systems. Therefore, such information should be limited. Once again there was no parity since Russia was not developing a missile defense system.

¶16. (S) Siemon noted the issue of the relationship between missile defense and strategic offensive arms (SOA) was being worked between Gottemoeller and Antonov. The United States and Russia had

differing ideas on the relationship between missile defense and SOAs. The United States was willing to acknowledge the relationship in the treaty and there were on-going discussions on statements addressing the issue. Other discussions on the specific aspects of a missile defense relationship should be conducted in a different venue, and separate discussions were on going.

¶17. (S) Poznikhir noted that a discussion between the two Presidents had taken place where they had indicated further transparency was needed for both offensive and defensive systems. He believed that including the exchange of telemetry on test launches of missile defense interceptors within the SFO treaty would help fulfill the Presidential ideas on transparency.

¶18. (S) Siemon stressed these discussions would have to take place in a different forum. The right place for the discussion was a separate group which could focus strictly on this issue. Siemon noted that some of the individuals from both sides had attended the O'Reilly presentation. He believed the United States was being very sincere and clear about plans the United States had for the evolution of its missile defense system, but again, these discussions should not occur in a forum for strategic nuclear arms reductions. Poznikhir retorted that Russia was also being open-minded and believed this treaty should reflect the relationship between missile defense and SOAs.

QUESTIONS FOUR AND FIVE: WHY NO POST-BOOST DATA?

¶19. (S) Paragraph 3. Question 4. Since this data was included in the START telemetric data exchanges, why would an exchange of telemetric data for the SCDM or post boost vehicle be excluded in this treaty?

¶20. (S) In response to question 4, Poznikhir asked Siemon to explain why the United States needed the exchange of telemetry from the SCDM; how would this information favor verification? Siemon responded that the exchange of SCDM telemetry was not for the purpose of verification. The exchange continued a process that had worked for 15 years under START and carried it forward to the SFO treaty as a transparency measure. Under START there were provisions to allow a Party to exempt provision of telemetry under certain circumstances concerning the encryption exemption for one existing ICBM or SLBM type. Siemon noted that over the life of the START Treaty neither Party had needed to exercise this exemption option.

¶21. (S) Siemon noted that for 15 years the Parties had exchanged interpretive data for the SCDM and the missile stages. The U.S. position was that if this information was exchanged for 15 years

under a verification regime, then why would it not be continued as a transparency regime in the SFO treaty. Poznikhir indicated that this exchange had occurred under a regime that existed for a very different reason than would exist for the SFO treaty. The exchange under START was to allow the verification of warhead attribution. Since the concept of warhead attribution for ICBMs and SLBMs will not exist in the SFO treaty, there was no need to exchange data on the SCDM. He noted that the current conditions were different, that a different relationship existed and the sides needed to trust each other to a certain extent.

¶22. (S) Mr. Shevchenko stated that since he was an expert on telemetry he knew which parameters had been broadcast under START. He realized different parameters were broadcast for prototype launches and serial launches or flight tests of operational systems. He also knew what parameters were needed for missile defense purposes. This was one reason the Russian side would not exchange telemetry data for SCDMs. He asked whether it was possible for the United States to provide what parameters it believed were needed or useful for the treaty. Poznikhir concluded discussion on this question stating that the United States had declared it would not accept provisions for the exchange of telemetric data on missile defense interceptor launches, therefore, Russia would not accept any provision for the exchange of telemetric data on the SCDM.

¶23. (S) Paragraph 4. Question 5. Would reentry vehicle telemetry be excluded from the exchange?

¶24. (S) Poznikhir stated "yes."

QUESTIONS SIX AND SEVEN: DEALING WITH EQUIPMENT AND RECORDING

¶25. (S) Paragraph 5. Question 6. Would it be sufficient to provide information for purchase of commercially-available equipment after carrying out the initial demonstration of recording media and playback equipment?

¶26. (S) Siemon said question 6 represented an attempt to simplify the complex equipment issues encountered during START. He asked whether it would be sufficient to provide information for purchase of commercially-available equipment after carrying out the initial demonstration of recording media and playback equipment. Under START the Party conducting the initial demonstration provided the other Party the opportunity to purchase the demonstrated equipment. The receiving Party paid for the equipment through cost settlement procedures. Siemon offered that under the SFO treaty there were two options for this process; accept the procedures as used under START or a process in which the initial demonstration was conducted

and the conducting Party then provided information about where the equipment could be commercially purchased. Poznikhir offered that after the demonstration the Party conducting the demonstration would need to provide the opportunity to purchase exactly the same equipment as was demonstrated. In this manner, if problems were encountered after the equipment was purchased, then the other Party could go back to the providing Party for resolution.

¶27. (S) Paragraph 5. Question 7. If a Party continues to use the same type of recording media and playback equipment used during START, would that equipment have to be demonstrated and new equipment provided? Is there any new equipment or techniques to be demonstrated for SFO?

¶28. (S) In response to question 7, Poznikhir indicated that the initial demonstration pertained to both equipment previously demonstrated and purchased under START and any new playback equipment that the Parties would introduce after entry into force (EIF).

QUESTION EIGHT: UNDERSTANDING WHEN ENCRYPTION WOULD BE USED

¶29. (S) Paragraph 6. Question 8. Would the telemetric information that is encrypted be provided in an encrypted form with the keys necessary to decrypt it, or would the information be decrypted prior to recording it for release to the other Party?

¶30. (S) Poznikhir asked Siemon to clarify the question. Siemon stated the question was if the launching Party encrypted the data and then decided that this launch would be one on which telemetry was exchanged, how would the providing Party handle the exchange of encrypted data? Poznikhir stated that there would not be encryption on any of the five launches on which data would be exchanged. A Party could encrypt on all other launches. Siemon provided an example in which both Parties conducted five launches; however, one Party encrypted on one of the launches. How would the exchange of telemetry work? Poznikhir stated he understood the question posed and would take it back to his delegation for study.

QUESTIONS NINE AND TEN: CLARIFYING "PROCESSING" AND "IMPEDING"

¶31. (S) Paragraph 6. Question 9. What does the term "processing" mean? Is that term the same as "playing back?"

¶32. (S) Poznikhir stated the answer to question 9 was easy. Processing was the capability to play back information as it had existed onboard the flight test vehicle. Play back meant the ability to play back data without it being impeded.

¶33. (S) Paragraph 6. Question 10. What is meant by "shall not impede?"

¶34. (S) Poznikhir stated "shall not impede" meant that neither Party would impede getting access to the data; in other words, no encryption, encapsulation, jamming or use of narrow directional beaming.

QUESTIONS ELEVEN, TWELVE AND THIRTEEN: QUESTIONS ABOUT
INTERPRETIVE DATA LEAD TO A RUSSIAN CHALLENGE ON TELEMETRY
EXCHANGE SUSPENSION

¶35. (S) Paragraph 7. Question 11. Will the specifications to define telemetric data timing and structure be provided along with the staging and separation information included on the recording media?

¶36. (S) The Russian response to question 11 provided insight to questions 12 and 13.

¶37. (S) Paragraph 7. Question 12. If so, is the intent to provide interpretive data to determine timing and structure, but

not the specific information for conversion of the data into physical values of parameters?

¶38. (S) Paragraph 7. Question 13. How does the "shall not impede" concept work in practice in exchanging interpretive data. Why would the exchange of interpretive data be limited?

¶39. (S) Poznikhir asked Siemon to explain question 11. Siemon stated the question dealt with interpretive data as used under START. How much interpretive data would a Party provide and what parts of the test launch would the interpretive data cover? Poznikhir indicated that Russia would provide information on the

stages of the SLBM and ICBM, which would include methods of encoding but would not include descriptions of parameters required to identify separation times and separation commands and their location within the telemetry frame. It would not provide information related to the SCDM and the reentry vehicle release. Responding to a question from Dr. Ringenberg, Poznikhir stated that other than separation commands telemetry provided would be similar to that provided under START. He asked what the U.S. position was regarding what interpretive data was needed and should be included in the telemetry protocol.

¶40. (S) Siemon asked Poznikhir about the question he took back to his delegation referencing the U.S. legal concern over denial of a treaty obligation to provide telemetry exchange during the first year of the treaty and the first 65 days of the calendar year when a Party chose to suspend exchange because a disagreement could not be resolved in the Bilateral Consultative Commission. Poznikhir reiterated that the Russian side placed this provision in its proposed text to enable a Party to suspend the exchange if it felt the exchange threatened its national security.

¶41. (S) Siemon stated that it was hard to believe that two sides could enter into a treaty with a provision where one side could choose not to comply with its obligations. During the Mullen-Makarov meeting, Admiral Winnefeld proposed a process in which the terms of the exchange were revisited. Presidents Obama and Medvedev met in Copenhagen and agreed that this should occur annually. Siemon believed that it was difficult for those at the working group level to change a decision made by the Presidents.

¶42. (S) Mr. Luchaninov questioned what impact a suspension of telemetry exchange would have on the implementation of a treaty based on verification since telemetry was not used for verification. Mr. Dean stated that all treaties came with the option for either side to withdraw if it felt its national security was threatened. This withdrawal clause was not related to verification but it was included in these treaties nonetheless. There were many items included in treaties that were not related to verification. If a Party determined an item was important it could include it in the treaty.

¶43. (S) Luchaninov responded that almost all of the provisions in the SFO treaty were related to reduction, control, and verification of strategic arms. The only issue that did not conform to this was telemetry. The U.S. side spoke of transparency as it applied to telemetry, but at the same time, telemetry was not important to the issues of reduction, control or verification. He restated his question; if one side suspended the telemetry exchange, was it envisioned that this side would suspend the main work of the treaty? Dean believed Luchaninov was looking at the issue in the wrong way. The U.S. perspective was that telemetry was an important issue, like any other issue that was included in the

treaty. The United States would never draft a core obligation that allowed one Party to unilaterally control compliance. It was a mistake to characterize telemetry as a "nice to have" for transparency and not as important as other treaty obligations.

¶44. (S) Siemon added that when the sides agreed to place a provision in the treaty they were obligated to comply with that provision. Provisions translated to obligations. If a Party could not continue to honor its commitment to comply with an obligation, it withdrew from the treaty. Poznikhir agreed that when a side signed a treaty it was obligated to comply with the treaty provisions. However, he believed that suspension of telemetry exchange did not impact the obligation to comply with the other parts of the treaty. Siemon disagreed with this statement. A Party should not have the unilateral right not to comply with an obligation of the treaty; a provision should not be in the treaty that allowed one Party to unilaterally walk away from an obligation. General Venevtsev used the long discussions in START's Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission as an example where suspension would provide motivation to resolve a question within a short time period.

¶45. (S) Poznikhir stated the right to suspend the exchange would not be a unilateral right, but a right of both Parties. If either Party suspended the exchange, the entire treaty would not collapse. The Parties could agree to foster discussion and would have 11 months to solve the problem. A long time period for discussion was not needed. If one Party were to use telemetry in a way that endangered the other's national security, the telemetry exchange would be suspended. This would be the case when one Party was working on missile defense and the other was not.

U.S. PROPOSAL FORMAT

¶46. (S) Siemon acknowledged the concerns and said he would discuss the Russian position and answers with colleagues back in Washington. He stated he planned to prepare a draft proposal in either of two ways: as an independent U.S. proposal or as a proposal incorporating the Russian-proposed text with the text of both sides bracketed. He asked which format the Russian side preferred. Poznikhir responded that the format did not matter as long as the Russian main proposals were included. Siemon stated that his preference would be to draft a merged document with brackets to explain the sides' differences. He would attempt to produce a first draft of the document without prejudice to either side's position and the sides would discuss where to place the brackets at the next meeting. Mr. LaPointe asked, given the START Telemetry Protocol as a starting point, what other points within the new protocol did the Russian side think should be put in the Protocol and which should be put into the Annex? Poznikhir stated the U.S. side could see that the Russian proposal included analogous items from START Treaty language as well as from START's Telemetry Protocol. Siemon stated he wanted to complete the text prior to the next meeting to give the Russian side time to read and understand it. He needed to coordinate any proposal with Washington. With the current weather situation in Washington it was not clear when this coordination would take place. He would work out the schedule once guidance arrived.

¶47. (U) Documents provided: None.

¶48. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Mr. Siemon

Mr. Ahlm

Lt Col Comeau

Mr. Dean

Mr. Hanchett (RO)

Mr. LaPointe

Ms. Pura

Dr. Ringenberg

Ms. Smith (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen Poznikhir

Mr. Luchaninov

Mr. Malyugin

Mr. Shevchenko

Gen Venevtsev

Mr. Voloskov

Ms. Komshilova (Int)

149. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS